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 1 
Verbs, Times and Objects1 
 
“Thus there is no one big mystery with regard to seeing, although little puzzles remain as 
to observing, watching, and so forth. One could point out, for example, that while they are 
activities, they sometimes have—and this is true more of observing than watching—an 
accomplishment sense: it takes some time to observe the passage of Venus across the sun 
or to watch an ant carrying home a dead fly. There are obvious parallels between the 
concepts of seeing and hearing and those of watching and listening, and so on. Thus we 
could continue this kind of investigation, but without any specific problem it would 
become tedious and idle.” (Vendler (1967), p.120) 
 
 
 
I am writing in the 60th year since the first publication of Zeno Vendler’s celebrated paper 
‘Verbs and Times’, and a half-century after the publication of the canonical version of the 
text in the 1967 collection of Vendler papers titled Linguistics in Philosophy. In his paper, 
Vendler articulates a distinction between four verb types, a distinction that has its source 
in their temporal characteristics (their ‘temporal schemas’), and he sets this distinction to 
work on families of epistemic, cognitive and perceptual verbs. The paper is one of the 
recognized classics of 20th century analytic philosophy. Vendler’s discussion generated a 
subject-matter for a new field within the developing discipline of formal semantics.2 And 
the verb typology he developed set an agenda for subsequent research in the philosophy of 
mind and action.3 But it is not straightforward to identify the source of the paper’s 
enduring influence and significance. The interest of the paper does not stem from the fact 
that Vendler introduced an entirely novel typology of verbs, nor that he was wholly 
original in applying such distinctions to epistemic, cognitive and perceptual verb 
                                                
1 Material from this paper has been presented in talks at the University of Warwick, King’s College, London, 
the University of Cambridge and the University of Chicago. Thanks to the audiences on those occasions. I 
am grateful to Jack Shardlow, Tristan Kreetz, Bill Brewer, Christoph Hoerl and Michael Kremer for helpful 
comments. Thanks to Ian Phillips, Hemdat Lerman, Guy Longworth and Rowland Stout for very helpful 
written comments on earlier drafts of this material. I owe particular thanks to Matthew Soteriou for very 
helpful discussions about ideas in this paper. 
2 For work in formal semantics that is shaped by Vendler’s verb typology and the research questions it 
focuses, see Dowty (1979), Taylor (1985), Bach (1986), Verkuyl (1993) and Rothstein (2004). Mourelatos 
(1978) includes influential criticisms of Vendler (1967) and attempts to develop an ontology of process that 
nevertheless develops many ideas from his work.  
3 For work in the philosophy of mind and action that includes discussion of Vendler (1967), and exploits an 
ontology that develops Vendler’s discussion see Steward (1997), Thompson (2008), Crowther (2009), 
Soteriou (2013), and Hornsby (2012). 
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constructions. Vendler’s verb typology, and his discussions of the applications of verbs 
across a range of cases largely inherit the structure, and much of the substance, of the 
discussion in Gilbert Ryle (1949) and (1954).4 Neither does the importance of the paper 
reside merely in the kinds of criticisms that Vendler offers of Ryle’s view of perceptual 
verbs. Those criticisms result in a modification rather than an outright rejection of Ryle’s 
view, and they raise more questions than they answer. It is true that the upshot of 
Vendler’s discussion of the temporal characteristics of verb forms is a catholic attitude 
towards perceptual verb forms that is original in the literature. But this feature of the paper 
does not seem to have occasioned much discussion. So it is unlikely that this in itself is the 
source of the influence and appeal of the work either. 
 
Rather, at least so I suggest, what distinguishes Vendler’s discussion is that observations 
he makes during the course of the paper allow questions about the relation between 
perceptual states and occurrences and their objects to be seen clearly for the first time.5 It 
is a question of this kind that is the focus of this paper. Take transitive verb phrases such 
as “believes that Aristotle was born in Stagira” or “hears the sound of the drill.” These 
phrases are complexes that consist of a verb (“believes ____” and “hears ____”) combined 
with a grammatical object (“that Aristotle was born in Stagira” and “the sound of the 
drill”). Remarks such as those made by Vendler in the opening epigram suggest that in 
some perceptual verb phrases there appears to be a match between the temporal properties 
of that which the verb object picks out and that which the verb phrase as a whole picks 
out. For example, observing the passage of Venus across the sun is a kind of occurrence 
that does not merely go on for a period of time (like walking or running) but takes some 
amount of time (like walking to the shops or running a mile). In this case it is also notable 
that what is observed—the passage of Venus across the sun—is itself something that takes 
some amount of time, rather than something that merely goes on for some amount of time. 
How widespread is such matching between the temporal properties of that which 
perceptual verbs and their objects pick out? And with respect to which temporal properties 
of verbs and their objects is there such a match?  
 
                                                
4 For related discussion see also Sibley (1955). 
5 It is also worth registering the thought that it is at least part of the truth that Vendler’s approach to these 
verb forms is systematic and putatively exhaustive in a way that Ryle’s piecemeal approach—an approach 
rooted in what he needs for his polemical purposes in the relevant works—is not. Thanks to Michael 
Kremer here. 
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In this paper I aim to develop and briefly defend the suggestion that there is a limited 
match between such temporal properties of perceptual verbs and their objects. The 
perception of temporally-extended events and processes seems to involve the sharing of a 
distinctive range of temporal properties between verbs and their objects. But there is no 
such match when the objects of perceptual verbs are primary substances—three-
dimensional concrete particulars such as human beings, palm trees and peregrine 
falcons—things that seem to persist across intervals of time by enduring not by occurring. 
 
Section one spells out Vendler’s verb typology and outlines the way that he applies that 
typology to notions of perception and the perceptual. Section two introduces in more 
detail some of the different observations that Vendler makes during the course of the 
paper that suggest that there might be a match between certain temporal characteristics of 
perceptual verbs and their objects. This section goes on to identify a number of questions 
about the existence and nature of such temporal matching that Vendler’s discussion may 
prompt, just one of which is the focus here. Section three identifies and rejects a simple 
proposal about the existence and extent of this matching. Section four develops the 
suggestion that there is temporal matching between some of the temporal properties of the 
objects of perception, but not others. Section five identifies some responses to this 
proposal, and provides some replies. Section six concludes by noting some of the 
consequences of the discussion for contemporary debates about the temporal properties of 
perception, and makes a suggestion about how research on the outstanding question 
identified in section two might proceed. 
 
First, some assumptions. Vendler’s temporal distinctions are primarily formulated as 
distinctions between kinds of ‘terms’ or ‘verbs’ with respect to their temporal features. 
But as well as talking about episodic verbs and their features, Vendler also uses those 
verbs in talking directly about kinds of episodes and their features. So, he characterizes 
“watches” as an “activity-verb” and seems to take this to allow us to characterize watching 
as an activity. This assumption, and the pattern of expression that manifests it, runs right 
through the Vendler paper that is the target of discussion here, and right through all of 
those papers of his that are collected together in the 1967 volume Linguistics in 
Philosophy. 
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This raises delicate questions about philosophical methodology. Addressing those 
questions would take us too far from the substance of what I want to discuss.6 In what 
follows, I will present Vendler’s account as one centred on terms and verb types. I assume 
that Vendler’s enquiry can be thought of as a broadly ‘conceptual’ enquiry, and not merely 
as narrowly focussed on contingent features of the English language. Further, like 
Vendler, I will talk not only about verbs, grammatical objects and their temporal features 
but mental states and occurrences, their objects, and their temporal features. I assume that 
here the subject-matter of our enquiry is temporal reality itself, but that we can proceed by 
examining the structure and content of our conceptions of temporal reality. 
 
Second, the aim here is to build up a picture of the temporal reality of states, events and 
their objects through examining how perceptual awareness and its objects strike us from 
the standpoint of first-person reflection. Therefore the ‘temporal properties’ relevant to 
this study are ‘manifest’ temporal properties. Manifest temporal properties are properties 
capable of revealing themselves as the properties they are from the standpoint of first-
person reflection, unaided by inference. For example, that one’s reading of this sentence 
lasted just a very few moments is a manifest temporal property of one’s reading. But that 
one’s reading this sentence causally depended on neurological activity involving electrical 
pulses of a particular temporal frequency is not a manifest temporal property of one’s 
reading. It is temporal properties of the former kind that are relevant to this enquiry. 
 
1. Vendler’s verb typology and the varieties of the perceptual 
 
In the first part of ‘Verbs and Times’ a fourfold distinction between verb types is offered, 
between ‘activity’ (or ‘process’) verbs, ‘accomplishment’ verbs, ‘achievement’ verbs, and 
‘state’ verbs. The typology is built up in a few steps. First, Vendler says that there is a 
basic distinction between those verbs that accept what he calls ‘continuous tenses’ and 
those that do not. Vendler (1967) says that the question “What are you doing?” can be 
answered by “I am walking” or “I am drawing” but not “I am knowing” or “I am 
believing”. “Knows” and “believes” are examples of state verbs. They single out states, 
which are things that may obtain over time but do not go on in time or occur in time. By 
                                                
6 For some of Vendler’s own reflections on these issues of method, see Vendler (1967, essay 1). For 
discussion of philosophical method in Cook Wilson and Austin that is relevant to these issues see 
(Longworth, forthcoming). 
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contrast, he says “I am walking” and “I am drawing” appear to single out “processes going 
on in time, that is, roughly, that they consist of successive phases following one another in 
time”. (1967, 99). 
 
With respect to the category of verbs that admit of continuous tenses—those that can be 
given in answer to the question: “What are you doing?”—there is a distinction between 
“activity terms” and “accomplishment terms.” Accomplishments (e.g. “walking to the 
shops”, “running a mile”) are kinds of process that proceed to a set terminal point at which 
they cease and which function as a criterion of success of completion for the 
accomplishment. Activities (e.g. “walking”, “running”) are processes that lack such 
points. In vocabulary that reflects the ancient origins of the distinction, the notion of 
activity is the notion of atelic process, the notion of accomplishment the notion of telic 
process, with the notion of telicity signifying the idea of an achievement that is a criterion 
of success or fulfilment for the process that unfolds. The difference between activities and 
accomplishments seems to be reflected in a range of differences in the temporal behaviour 
of the relevant notions. If someone stops walking (which is atelic process) then it follows 
that they did walk, but if someone stops walking to the shops (telic process) it does not 
follow that they did walk to the shops. Accomplishments take time, and they can properly 
be said to finish, given that there are points determined by the nature of the occurrence at 
which they are complete. Activities go on for periods of time, but given that they lack telic 
points they do not take time, and they cannot properly be said to finish. Vendler (1967) 
also says that “activity terms” are homogeneous in a way that accomplishments are not. In 
case I write a letter in an hour, I have not written the letter in any sub-interval of that hour. 
But if I was running for an hour, then I have run during every sub-interval of that hour. 
 
The category of those verbs that do not admit of continuous tenses admits of a further 
distinction, between those verbs that may indicate relations to intervals of time and those 
that are notions of instantaneous occurrences. “State terms” single out what may obtain for 
intervals of time. “Achievement” terms (e.g. “reach the summit”, “cross the finish line”, 
“stopping running”) however, are used to predicate instantaneous occurrence, what occurs 
but does not occur over intervals of time. Apparent uses of achievement terms in 
continuous or progressive constructions (e.g. “the train was stopping for about a quarter of 
a mile”, “they were reaching the summit over the course of three hours”) can be recast as 
accomplishment terms that pick out telic processes (“a train braking to a standstill”, 
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“mountaineers making the final push for the summit”) in which achievements function as 
telic points. 
 
In the later parts of the paper, Vendler shows how these distinctions between verb types 
can be put to work to help us get a clearer sense of the temporal characteristics of 
cognitive and perceptual notions. It is perception and perceptual verbs that we’ll focus on 
here. The background to this part of the paper is the discussion offered by Gilbert Ryle, in 
chapters 5 and 7 of the Concept of Mind and in chapter 7 of Dilemmas. In these 
discussions, Ryle argues that it is a mistake to ask what kind of state or process perception 
or seeing is, and whether it is physical or psychological. He says that seeing isn’t any kind 
of state or process at all. Ryle says that we should think of perception or “sees” as a kind 
of ‘success verb’, to be understood by analogy with such verbs as “find” or “win”, and 
contrasted with ‘search’ or ‘task’ verbs such as hunt or look for. Seeing, like finding and 
winning, are occurrences, but they do not take any time at all. They are instantaneous 
events. “Sees” is a perceptual ‘achievement-verb’.  
 
Vendler agrees with Ryle (1949, 1953) in so far as he thinks that some of our talk about 
perception is talk of a perceptual achievement. When we talk in terms of “spotting”, 
“noticing” and “recognizing” we are talking in terms of an event or an occurrence, but that 
lacks temporal duration. We can’t ask “How long did you notice that for?” or “How long 
did you spot that bird for?” So these kinds of uses reveal a perceptual achievement, which 
he calls the notion of “seeing as spotting”. 
 
But Vendler thinks it is a mistake to think that perception and specifically “sees” is only 
the notion of an achievement. For example, he notes (1967, 113) that a perfectly suitable 
answer to the question: “How long did you see the killer?” is “Oh, I am quite tall, I saw 
him all the time he was in the courtroom. I was watching him”. In this completely 
standard kind of exchange, “see” doesn’t pick out an achievement, or something that 
exists only at an instant, but something that is in existence over an interval of time. So 
then, if there is a notion of seeing or of perception, according to which seeing is not 
instantaneous, should we take that notion to be that of a state, which can obtain over an 
interval, or some kind of process or accomplishment? Here Vendler argues by elimination. 
“Seeing” as it is understood in such sentences, cannot be a process verb or an 
accomplishment verb, because it can’t occur in what he calls ‘the continuous tense’. 
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Vendler (1967) claims that: “I am seeing such and such” can never be an answer to the 
question: “What are you doing?” It follows that the notion of seeing manifest in such talk 
is the notion of a state, rather than an achievement, activity or accomplishment. 
 
Even if “seeing” or “perceiving” are not process or accomplishment verbs, there are 
notions of perceptual processes or activities. One of the distinctive features of Vendler’s 
paper is the attention he pays to notions that have gone by and large neglected in the 
literature in philosophy of mind. In this category fall such notions as ‘watching’, ‘looking 
at’, ‘observing’, ‘scrutinizing’, ‘looking for’ and ‘watching out for’.7 Watching or looking 
at things are things that one can be said to be doing, that is, they take the continuous tense 
by Vendler’s lights. So they can be distinguished both from perceptual states and 
achievements. As in the broader category of processes, we seem to be able to distinguish a 
class of verbs that are verbs of ‘perceptual activity’, and have the atelic form characteristic 
of activity according to Vendler’s account, and a class of ‘perceptual accomplishment’ 
verbs. While we think that watching or looking at things can go on for periods of time 
rather than take time, and do not have a telic point or achievement at which they aim, we 
might contrast this with such activities as watching the bird fly from one side of the field 
to the other. Watching the bird fly from one side of the field to the other is a perceptual 
activity that unfolds towards a point of completion, a visual achievement of some kind, at 
which it can be said to finish. 
 
So, the conclusion of the application of Vendler’s verb typology to perceptual verbs is not 
that our conceptions of perception and the perceptual instantiate a single temporal 
category. We can distinguish different relations to time across different perceptual 
constructions and thus differentiate between various perceptual categories. The question: 
“Into what temporal category does the perceptual fall?” should be rejected as it stands. 
 
2. Questions about verbs and times 
 
As I have presented it so far, what Vendler offers in his paper is a verb typology that 
refines and elaborates some distinctions that Ryle had drawn, and applies these 
distinctions to perception in a way that involves rejecting Ryle’s idea that perception 
                                                
7 For discussion of perceptual activities such as watching and looking see O’Shaughnessy (2000), Crowther 
(2009), Soteriou (2013) and Kalderon (2017). 
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cannot be a state. But what is original in the discussion in Vendler (1967) that explains its 
place in the development of research on the temporal aspects of mind? Here is a 
suggestion. In the course of the discussion over the last few pages of the paper, Vendler 
makes a number of observations that suggest that where we have a perceptual verb phrase 
in which a perceptual verb takes some grammatical object, there is an intimate connection 
between the temporal properties of the verb and the temporal properties of its object.8 For 
example, he says: 
 
“If one tells us that he saw Carmen last night, he means that he saw all four acts of 
Carmen. Besides, he might say that it took three hours to see Carmen. Perhaps one might 
even answer the question What are you doing? by I am seeing Carmen on TV.” (1967, 
119-120) 
 
First off, it is worth noting that it is not clear that this opening claim about what it means 
to say one saw Carmen last night reflects some quite general truth about the perception of 
occurrences over time. I might tell you that I saw the Trooping of the Colour without, it 
seems to me, implying that I saw every successive part of it. Nevertheless, it is plausible 
that contexts in which we talk about seeing artistic performances characteristically involve 
a commitment to the idea that we have seen each temporal part of the performance. In any 
case, let’s assume that this implication holds in the present case. What is of particular 
interest here, I think, is something else. The object of the construction: “I am seeing 
Carmen on TV” is, it seems, an accomplishment, the performing of Carmen. It is 
something that can be going on in time, but which takes time. If for whatever reason the 
singers on stage stop performing Carmen it does not follow that they have performed it (in 
the way that it follows from the fact that they stop singing that they have sung). But so 
also does “seeing”, in this construction, seem to be an accomplishment notion. As Vendler 
notes, in this sense of “see” one might say that it took one three hours to see Carmen (as 
one might say that it took one an hour to write a letter). So, in this case, the Vendler verb 
category (call it the ‘aspectual category’) of the verb object and the complex verb phrase 
seem to coincide. 
 
                                                
8 Though Ryle (1949) discusses verbs with grammatical objects—for example, at (1949, 130-147)—he fails 
to note that there are questions that can be raised about the relation between the temporal characteristics of 
the whole verb phrase and the verb object. 
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A little later, he writes: 
 
“One could point out that while (observing, watching) are activities, they sometimes 
have—and this is true more of observing than of watching—an accomplishment sense: it 
takes some time to observe the passage of Venus across the sun or to watch an ant 
carrying home a dead fly.” (1967, 120) 
 
An ant carrying home a dead fly is an accomplishment. If an ant stops carrying home a 
dead fly (for whatever reason) then it does not follow that it did carry a dead fly home. But 
so also is one’s watching of the ant carrying home a dead fly an accomplishment. If one 
stops watching the ant carrying home a dead fly it does not follow that one did watch the 
ant carry a dead fly home (though it does follow that the ant has been carrying home a 
dead fly and one had been watching an ant carrying home a dead fly). Again, the aspectual 
category of the object of the verb is shared by the complex verb construction. 
 
Earlier in the paper, Vendler has noted the difficulty of making good sense of the 
following expressions: 
 
(1) *I spotted him cross the street 
(2) *I spotted him run 
 
With the previous remarks in mind, one might observe that a feature of these sentences is 
the difficulty of seeing them as cases in which the temporal category of the verb object is 
shared by the whole verb phrase. “Crossing the street” and “run” are kinds of process 
terms (the first an ‘accomplishment’ term and the second an ‘activity’ term). Were this 
category to be shared by the verb phrase, then that phrase as a whole would be an activity 
or an accomplishment. But it is hard to make sense of it as either. That would require us to 
be able to make sense of “spotting something” as something that goes on in time. But we 
can’t. Spotting something is an instantaneous occurrence. So perhaps the difficulty of 
making good sense of these expressions is a manifestation of the fact that in complex 
perceptual verb phrases the temporal characteristics of the verb object and the verb phrase 
are shared. 
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What examples like these might seem to suggest is that there is some kind of match 
between the temporal properties of verbs and the temporal properties of their objects. The 
examples prompt us to focus attention on the relations between the temporal 
characteristics of verbs and their objects, and on the idea that there might be systematic 
relations between these properties.9 For a reader who is struck by the profound insight and 
interest of these observations, Vendler’s apparently casual attitude to them, as evidenced 
in our opening epigram, is extraordinary.  
 
In any case, to ensure that our continued investigations are neither tedious nor idle, let us 
identify two questions to focus discussion of these issues: 
 
Q1. In verb phrases involving a perceptual verb and a grammatical object, is there sharing 
of temporal properties of the complex perceptual verb and the verb object? If so, which 
properties, precisely, are shared? In less ‘linguistic’ form, we might ask, where some 
perceptual state or occurrence has an object, is there coincidence in the temporal 
properties of the states or occurrences and their objects? If so, which temporal properties 
are shared? 
 
Q2. If there is sharing of such temporal properties, what, if anything, is the significance of 
this? How is this match to be explained? 
 
The first of these questions is philosophically primary, and will be the focus of discussion 
in what follows. Question 2 I will take up elsewhere. But in advance of that discussion, it 
is worth noting some of the possibilities. If we set aside the possibility that the match is a 
mere accident, then the temporal characteristics of the perceptual verb phrase might be 
determined wholly by temporal features of the verb object, wholly by properties of the 
perceptual verb, or determined by some combination of features of the verb and verb 
object. It is also worth noting that there may be different explanations for the sharing of 
different temporal properties. 
 
                                                
9 It was the insight of these observations, I suggest, that prompted a generation of researchers in the infant 
discipline of formal semantics to turn their attentions towards attempts to understand the relationship 
between temporal properties of verb objects and verb phrases. For a contribution to these questions, as well 
as an overview of post-Vendler developments in the formal semantics of verb aspect grounded in a 
discussion of features of the framework suggested in his paper, see Rothstein (2004). 
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3. A simple proposal identified and rejected 
 
Here is one simple suggestion about how to answer our question: what the observations 
identified from Vendler’s paper show is that there is a quite general coincidence of the 
aspectual categories to which the verb object and the complex verb phrase belong. One 
might support such a claim by drawing attention to further cases of apparent match 
between the aspectual categories of verb phrases and objects. Take: 
 
(3) Isaac saw Beatrice cross the finish line 
 
Suppose we take the object in (3) to be an achievement, an instantaneous occurrence that 
caps a period of activity, and not something that goes on over time. Then it seems these 
properties are reflected in the properties of the ‘seeing’. It does not make sense to ask how 
long it took Isaac to see Beatrice cross the finish line. That might be taken to show that 
Isaac’s visual perception of that achievement is itself an achievement, therefore, an 
instance of seeing as ‘spotting’. 
 
Elaborating on the example of congruence between verb phrases and objects with respect 
to the category of accomplishments it seems that there are also related cases involving 
activities: 
 
(4) Beatrice is watching Venus moving  
 
(5) Lily is watching the ant carrying a dead fly 
 
The thought may be that in these cases, the verb objects are movement and carriage of a 
dead fly. Moving and carrying a dead fly are activities, rather than accomplishments. If 
something stops moving it did move. And if something stops carrying a dead fly it did 
carry a dead fly. But then, it will be noted, so also do we see this ‘activity-behaviour’ in 
the perceptual verbs. If Beatrice stops watching Venus moving she did watch it move. 
And if Lily stops watching the ant carrying a dead fly she did watch it carry a dead fly. So 
here is a case in which the verb object and the verb phrase both belong to the ‘activity’ 
category.  
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Also, take: 
 
(6) Isaac saw the colour of the flowers 
 
Ignoring tense for simplicity, the thought here is that the verb object in (6) is a state, a 
particular chromatic state of the flowers: the flowers’ being yellow, for example. This state 
is something that can exist over an interval or for an interval. That is what differentiates it 
from an achievement. But it does not go on in time, or go on for a period of time. That is 
what differentiates it from an activity or an accomplishment. But these features are also, it 
might be suggested, shared by the verb, by “saw” as it is understood here. Here, it may be 
said, ‘seeing the colour of the flowers’ is not something that Isaac does or which goes on 
in or for a time. It is the state being visually aware of something. Though being visually 
aware of something can obtain over an interval of time it is not something that goes on 
over such an interval. 
 
But this simple proposal clearly must be rejected. Perceptual activities can take as objects 
the states or conditions of things. For example, assuming the account of the verb object in 
a case of this type suggested above: 
 
(7) Isaac is looking at the colour of the flowers 
 
involves a perceptual activity taking the chromatic condition of the flowers as its object. 
What Isaac is looking at in such a case is some way that the flowers are or a condition that 
they are in. A way that the flowers are, or a condition that they are in, is not something 
that occurs, or goes on in time, as looking at the flowers is. In this case, the verb phrase 
and their object do not share their aspectual categories. 
 
Perceptual states are also capable of taking things which occur or go on as their objects. 
For example, consider the following: 
 
(8) From where she stood on the hill above the amphitheatre Lily could see the 
performance of Carmen. 
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In (8), the perceptual verb phrase “could see the performance of Carmen” is most naturally 
understood as stative. The sentence says that from her vantage point Lily was visually 
aware of the performance of Carmen. But though her visual awareness of Carmen is a 
state, and so something that obtains rather than goes on over time, the object of that visual 
awareness—the performance—is not a state, but something that goes on over time. 
However we are to respond to the observations made in the closing sections of Vendler 
(1967), a simple proposal of this kind cannot be correct. 
 
4. Limited matching: manifest occurrence and manifest endurance 
 
My view is that some of the objects of perceptual states and occurrences share a range of 
temporal features with those states and occurrences, but other objects do not. There is a 
matching of temporal properties, but such matching is limited.  
 
Cases of perceptual activities directed on events and processes that go on over time reveal 
varieties of temporal matching.10 Let us focus one of Vendler’s own cases. Suppose one 
watches an ant carrying home a dead fly. One sees the ant start to move across the garden 
paving, then watches it wind its way up the side of a log, reach the top, then run along the 
surface before disappearing into a nest hole in the wood. One shared property seems to be 
temporal duration. If the ant’s journey seems to one to have only lasted a few moments, 
then the watching of that journey lasted only a few moments. But if one is a seasoned ant 
watcher and this journey took a long time (relative to the usual speed of such journeys) 
then so also did the watching. 
 
Further, both the watching and the journey have temporal parts or temporal phases that 
succeed one another in time and stand in the same kind of ordering relations 
(‘before/after’ and ‘earlier than/later than’). The temporal structure and content of these 
successions seem to be shared. The ant climbed up the log, then after that ran along the 
surface and then after that disappeared into the hole. But so also one watched the ant climb 
up the log then run along the surface and then disappear into the hole.  
 
                                                
10 The discussion that follows draws on claims about the perception of events made in Soteriou (2011, 
2013), and Phillips (2010, 2014a, 2014b). I make no claims about Soteriou’s and Phillips’s commitments 
with respect to the specific questions posed at the end of section 3, nor about the limited matching account 
developed below. 
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Finally, the journey and the watching appear to share their temporal location. Even if the 
physics of light transmission leads us to deny that the actual temporal location of the 
events witnessed are simultaneous with the actual temporal location of the current phase 
of one’s watching of those events, nevertheless it seems to one as if the occurrences 
witnessed are simultaneous with one’s watching of them. The sharing of the temporal 
location between events watched and their watching is manifest when we reflect that these 
successions themselves unfold, from the perspective of the viewer, successively. As one 
watches the journey unfold, successive temporal phases of the journey one watches are, 
successively, presented as simultaneous with successive temporal phases of one’s 
watching of that journey. With respect to the sharing of these temporal features, perceptual 
activities are distinct from visual imagination and visual recollection. In visually 
recollecting some occurrence, say, a particular walk in the country one took last year, the 
events so recalled do not seem to have a temporal location that is simultaneous with the 
location of one’s recollection of them.  
 
Over the time that the ant was watched we also find matching of duration, order and 
location between various states of perceptual awareness and their objects. One was 
visually aware of the ant’s journey over the time one watched it. Here, the interval of time 
over which one saw that journey seems to be coincident with the amount of time that 
journey manifestly took. While one’s visually awareness of the ant’s journey obtained 
over the whole interval, there is also a succession of distinct states of visual awareness and 
changes between those states over the time one watched the journey. For example, one 
saw the ant climb the side of the log, and then after that one saw the ant scuttle along the 
surface (no longer seeing it climb) and then after that one saw the ant disappear into its 
nest. These perceptual states share their temporal order with the temporal phases of the 
ant’s journey, first climbing the side of the log, then running along the surface, then 
disappearing into the nest. The objects of states of awareness are also apparently 
simultaneous with those states. As one watches the ant, it seems to one as if the movement 
along the surface that one perceives is simultaneous with one’s visual perception of that 
movement. Visual perception of the ant’s journey is also distinct from visual imagination 
or recollection of a similar journey in this respect. 
 
At certain points throughout such temporally-extended perceptual activities we also find 
matching between the temporal properties of perceptual achievements and their objects. 
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At the very start of one’s watching of the ant’s journey, for example, one saw the ant start 
to move. The ant starting to move is an instantaneous occurrence with no temporal 
duration, but it is not an ‘isolated’ occurrence: it is the durationless time of onset of the 
ant’s movement. But it seems also that one’s seeing the ant starting to move here is also 
no mere isolated extensionless occurrence but is the point of onset of something: some 
time occupying perceptual state, such as the visual awareness of the ant’s movement, 
perhaps, or of a perceptual activity, such as one’s watching the ant moving. As well as 
their duration, these achievements also share their temporal order with the perceptual 
achievements of which they are the objects. The ant started to move before it reached the 
top of the log, which in turn came before its disappearance into the nest. But so also did 
the seeing of the ant’s starting to move come before the seeing of it reaching the top of the 
log which in turn came before one saw it cross the threshold of the nest. So also do we 
seem to find the sharing of the temporal location of these perceptual achievements and 
their objects. From one’s own perceptual perspective, the time at which one begins to see 
the ant’s movement is the same time as that at which the ant’s movement seems to begin. 
 
But even if there is reason to think that temporal duration, order and location is shared 
between perceptual states, occurrences and their objects in cases of event perception, these 
relations do not apply across the whole range of objects of perceptual verbs and objects. 
For not all of the objects of perceptual states and occurrences are events. Consider the 
following: 
 
(10) Tom spotted the peregrine 
 
(11) Isaac looked at the oleander bush 
 
(12) Beatrice watched the cat 
 
(13) Lily was visually aware of the ant 
 
In each of these cases, the grammatical object of the perceptual verb is a singular noun 
phrase that refers to a concrete, material particular. In each of these cases the objects are 
central exemplars of Aristotelian primary substances, things that are bounded, countable, 
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material particulars that belong to kinds that determine principles of activity for those 
things. 
 
With respect to (10), a peregrine is not something that occurs, and its existence is not 
instantaneous or durationless. Peregrines exist over intervals of time, of some non-zero 
duration, no matter how short that interval is. So, in (10) there can’t be a match between 
the duration of the object and the achievement. In (11) and (12) while both the perceptual 
activities and primary substances have temporal duration—they exist over intervals of 
time—it is hard to make sense of the sharing of the other temporal properties discussed 
above. Suppose one watches a cat walking across the overgrown lawn. Unlike the 
movement of the cat across the lawn, the cat itself does not seem to unfold successively, 
temporal part by temporal part, as one’s watching of it goes on temporal part by temporal 
part across that interval of time. Also, while we can locate the onset of the cat’s walk, and 
temporal parts of the cat’s walk, as before or after one another, we can’t locate what is 
manifestly the cat before or after anything else. And so also, it seems, we should be 
sceptical of the idea that over an interval of time over which the cat is watched, it seems to 
us as if the temporal location of a temporal part of our watching of the cat is simultaneous 
with the temporal location of a temporal part of the cat. It is the whole cat that is manifest 
to us in our perceptual experience as that activity occurs, phase by phase, in time.  
 
Similar difficulties attach to (13). A state of visual awareness of an ant is something that 
can obtain over an interval, and so may share temporal duration with the object of that 
state. But perceptual states over any interval of time are capable of being ordered in a 
succession the constituents of which are related as ‘before/after’ or ‘earlier/later’. When 
one watches the ant carrying the fly home, for example, one was visually aware of the ant 
climbing the side of log, then one was visually aware of it travelling down the log, then 
one was visually aware of it circumnavigating the stump of the bough. The awareness of 
the stump circumnavigation was later than the awareness of the journey across the top of 
the log which was later than the awareness of the ant climbing to the top. But the ant itself 
that is the object of one’s watching is not capable of being temporally ordered in terms of 
being earlier and later than anything else. It is the ant itself that is present to one in one’s 
visual awareness of it over time, rather than temporal parts of the ant. 
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Adopting the vocabulary of a familiar claim about the persistence of primary substances 
over time, let us say that primary substances endure over time. Endurance over an interval 
of time is a manifest temporal property; one that is accessible to the subject in first 
personal reflection on how such objects seem to occupy time when they watch or look at 
them. In virtue of their seeming to endure, the primary substances that come to visual 
attention manifestly possess temporal properties that the perceptual activities directed on 
such things, and the succession of states that obtain over the time such activities go on, 
clearly lack. Those substances exist over time, but they are manifestly present in their 
entirety at any time. Their existence over an interval does not consist in the existence of a 
temporally ordered succession of temporal parts over any an interval. 
 
Before moving ahead to consider some responses to this approach, let’s look back at some 
of the observations that motivated our enquiry from the perspective of such a limited 
matching account. A number of different possibilities about how to understand these 
observations are consistent with this approach. Here is one suggestion about watching as 
activity and accomplishment. Watching something, it might be said, is primarily an 
activity. In the case of watching the ant’s journey, the basic activity is watching an ant 
moving or watching an ant carrying a fly.  In either case, if one stops watching an ant 
moving or carrying a fly one has watched it move or carry a fly. And that remains so even 
if it is conceded that such an activity is accompanied by the intention to watch the ant 
moving until it gets back to its nest. However, given that one’s watching of the ant 
stopped when it did (as the ant entered the nest) the previous stretch of perceptual activity 
can be derivatively recast as a perceptual accomplishment that took a certain amount of 
time to reach that point. This is to understand the notion of watching an ant carry a dead 
fly home as a ‘resultant accomplishment’.11 If we understand ‘seeing Carmen’ as 
something that one can genuinely be said to be doing, as Vendler suggests, then seeing 
Carmen must be taken to be the perceptual activity of watching Carmen, and so admits of 
the same set of options just described.12  
                                                
11 See Rothstein (2004, ch.3) for detailed discussion of resultant accomplishments. 
12 If ‘seeing Carmen’ is instead understood as the state of being perceptually aware of Carmen, things are 
more complex. Adopting Vendler’s suggestion would be to take the perceptual state of seeing Carmen to be 
a kind of accomplishment. The idea that any state could be a kind of accomplishment has generally been 
rejected. (See, for example, Rothstein (2004, 14-7)) Here the thought is that if, say, the glass was fragile 
from t1- t10 then it was fragile at any point throughout, or during any sub-interval of t1- t10. One way to 
explain the failure of the perceptual state to be an accomplishment might be to hold that one sees Carmen in 
virtue of seeing a temporal part or phase of Carmen. And that state predication will not show the 
characteristics of an accomplishment. (Thanks to Rowland Stout here). But there are other possibilities. For 
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With respect to seeing as spotting, (5) and (6) to amount to the rejection of the idea that 
one can spot temporally-extended occurrences. The most straightforward route here is to 
reject the claim. Where spotting is understood as a temporally instantaneous perceptual 
occurrence, for one to spot someone running or spot his run is a durationless transition 
from absence of perceptual awareness of his movement to a state of perceptual awareness 
of movement. Of course, one may also merely spot someone. That would be a perceptual 
achievement which is the durationless point of onset of watching, looking at, or perceiving 
them. 
 
5. Questions about limited matching 
 
These ideas will likely prompt responses from a number of different directions. Because 
claims about temporal matching in the case of the perception of events are more familiar 
in recent discussion, here I focus on responses that concede these ideas but dispute the 
relevant claims about the temporal characteristics of the perception of primary substances. 
Some of these responses can be disarmed reasonably straightforwardly. But some of these 
worries it will not be possible to address wholly satisfactorily in the space available to me 
here. In any case, identifying these worries and lines of response will help to develop a 
better understanding of manifest endurance and suggest directions for further research. 
 
(i) Perhaps the surface form of expressions such as (10)- (13) is misleading, and we should 
see the logical form of these expressions as containing a place to be filled, perhaps in the 
context of use, by material that picks out something event-like, or processive. So, perhaps, 
if one spots an object then what one spots is in fact an instantaneous occurrence involving 
the object. If one watches or looks at an object, what one is really watching or looking at 
is some activity or process in which the object is engaged. For example, watching a bird is 
watching a bird flying or walking across the grass. And if one is visually aware of an 
                                                                                                                                      
example, Matthew Soteriou (2011, 2013) has argued that when perceptual states take events for their objects, 
for example, the visual perception of movement over an interval of time, they exhibit some of the 
characteristic behaviour of accomplishments, including failure to be ‘homogeneous down to instants’. 
Soteriou’s argument turns on consequences of his view that the obtaining of perceptual states over intervals 
time constitutively depends on perceptual activities or occurrences which go on over those times. These 
issues cannot be pursued further here. What ought to be noted then is that even if we understand ‘seeing 
Carmen’ as a state of visual awareness, there is a route to defending Vendler’s claim that there is a ‘queer 
accomplishment sense’ of ‘seeing’. I leave these further issues open. (For critical discussion of Soteriou’s 
discussion of non-homogeneous states see Steward (2018)). 
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object, one is aware of some ongoing process, activity or event involving that object, an 
ongoing process which unfolds in a succession and which provides the basis for a 
succession of perceptual states over the relevant interval of time. If that is so, then any 
case of the perception of a primary substance over time will also be a case of the 
perceptual awareness of events or processes, awareness that involves the relevant match 
between its own temporal properties and those of its objects. 
 
Setting out these ideas in a more substantive way and determining whether they are 
correct or not would take us far beyond what can be done in this paper. But there is, in any 
case, a basic reply to this worry. Even if it were conceded that all watching of objects was 
the watching of objects which were visibly engaged in activity, or that all states of visual 
awareness of objects are cases of awareness of objects that are visibly engaged in 
processes over time, for all that, those primary substances which are the agents or subjects 
of those activities or processes nevertheless seem to endure over time in a way that those 
events or processes do not. Arguing that all objects which manifestly endure are engaged 
in activities or processes over the intervals they are watched or perceived, even if true, 
does not itself discharge the obligation to show how the manifest endurance of those 
primary substances over time can be accommodated within an approach built around the 
idea that it is temporal duration, order and location which is shared by perceptual states 
and occurrences and their objects. 
 
(ii) Perhaps watching and looking, while processes, manifestly endure over the intervals of 
time they go on. If so, there would no longer be any particular difficulty with the idea that 
there is a match between the manifest temporal properties of primary substances and the 
temporal properties of activities of watching or looking. One route to such a view is the 
account of processes developed by Rowland Stout in a series of papers.13 According to 
Stout, processes are ‘occurrent continuants’; while such processes as fighting, walking and 
watching are to be distinguished from primary substances, given that they are things that 
occur, such processes are distinct from particular complete events of fighting, walking or 
watching with respect to the way that they occupy time. Finished fights, walks and 
stretches of perceptual activity are things that have temporal parts over intervals of time, 
                                                
13 See, in particular, the discussions in Stout (1997, 2016). 
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but processes do not. Processes, like primary substances on the endurantist picture, are 
‘wholly present’ at any time they exist.   
 
My view is that the thesis that processes are occurrent continuants ought to be resisted, 
though, and that therefore a view of this kind cannot be used to ground such a response. 
Elsewhere I have offered a detailed response to some of the key arguments that have been 
used to motivate this view of processes.14 Now is not the place to rehearse the details of 
the arguments for the view nor the reasons there may be for resisting them. What can be 
said at this point is just that the view that processes are continuants is controversial, and 
subject to lively dispute in the recent literature. Pursuing this line of response to the 
limited matching account would then require a way to negotiate difficulties with 
arguments for the continuant processes view. 
 
(iii) Someone might dispute the claim that substances such as human beings, palm trees 
and peregrines seem to endure over the intervals of time they are perceived. If it is not the 
case that such objects seem to endure over intervals of time, then this part of the limited 
matching thesis is mistaken. It might be argued that what is manifest in perceptual 
awareness is merely that such substances persist over an interval of time; where to persist 
is just to exist over such an interval of time. What is manifest in perceptual awareness is 
neutral as regards the mode of persistence of primary substances.15 
 
The problem with this suggestion is that if this is true of how primary substances appear to 
exist over intervals of time, then it is unclear why it would not also be true of how the 
processes that they are engaged in appear to exist over intervals of time. For processes 
persist over time as well. And if the claim is now that both processes as well as primary 
substances seem to exist over time in a way which is neutral with respect to their mode of 
persistence over time, then this proposal cannot be reconciled with how the world strikes 
us from the perspective of the perceiving subject. In one’s perceptual encounters with the 
world, one is presented with processes which go on in time successively, phase after 
continuous phase, over intervals of time, and things which manifestly do not, such things 
as the objects which are the agents or subjects of those processes. What is manifest to us 
here when we reflect from the standpoint of perceptual awareness on primary substances 
                                                
14 See Crowther (2018). For related argument against the occurrent continuants thesis see Soteriou (2018). 
15 Thanks to Jack Shardlow for pressing me about this line of objection, despite disagreeing with it. 
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which are visibly engaged in activity—ants apparently running across surfaces of logs—is 
not merely the temporal characteristics of processes and the primary substances engaged 
in process, but the manifest contrast in the mode of their persistence across intervals of 
time.  
 
(iv) A theme of much discussion in the recent literature—discussion that there is not the 
space to review here—is that there is not a satisfactory notion of endurance that is fit for 
purpose as a way to frame meaningful and non-trivial disputes about material persistence 
over time.16 But if the notion of endurance is not well-understood, then neither is the 
notion of manifest endurance. So the limited matching account needs to be rejected. 
 
This line of thought raises interesting questions that take us beyond what can be discussed 
here. In advance of a lengthier discussion, however, what can be said is that we do not 
need to have access to a satisfactory way of formulating the notion of endurance (or 
‘endurantism’) in order to have reasons for taking temporal matching to be limited. The 
core claim is just that primary substances such as palm trees and peregrines manifestly 
relate to intervals of time in a way that perceptual states, and occurrences, whether 
achievements or processes, do not. But to establish this it is sufficient to note that primary 
substances appear over intervals of time as non-successively present over those intervals, 
and as not capable of being temporally located as ‘before’ or ‘after’, ‘earlier than’, or 
‘later than’ other objects of perception. Perceptual activities such as watching or looking 
at an object over an interval of time occur over an interval, and their occurrence involves a 
succession of activity-phases. It is true that perceptual states, such as being visually aware 
of a palm tree or a peregrine falcon, over an interval, do not occur. But these states are 
capable of being ordered in terms of before and after. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
After identifying several questions about the relation between verb phrases and their 
objects that arise from remarks made in Vendler (1967) I have attempted to show that in 
attempting to answer Q1, reflection on the temporal properties of perception of events and 
                                                
16 For discussion of these issues see Hofweber and Velleman (2011), Fine ([2006]2008), Crisp and Smith 
(2005), Mackinnon (2002), Donnelly (2011). I will discuss the bearing of questions about the temporal 
characteristics of activities and processes on questions about the persistence of substance over time and 
debates about the nature of endurantism in more detail elsewhere. 
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the perception of enduring objects seems to drive us in two different directions. This sets a 
constraint on any convincing answer to Q2. A satisfactory account of the significance of 
the sharing of temporal properties such as duration, order and temporal location across 
perceptual states and occurrences ought to be capable also of explaining the failures of 
matching in the perception of primary substances.  
 
One reason that this tension is of interest is that the manifest endurance of primary 
substances encountered in visual awareness has gone relatively neglected in that part of 
contemporary philosophy of perception that has focussed on the temporal aspects of 
perception. Those discussions have invariably focused on the temporal aspects of the 
perception of events, processes and changes.17  
 
In a recent paper, for example, Ian Phillips (2014a) attempts to defend what he calls a 
‘naïve view’ of the temporal properties of perceptual experience. He writes: 
 
According to the naïve view, when all goes well, your stream of consciousness inherits the 
temporal structure of the events that are its contents. You “take in” the temporal structure 
of the events you witness in witnessing them. As a result, the temporal structure of 
experience matches the temporal structure of its objects. In cases of illusion, it is as if this 
is so. Thus, in every case, the temporal structure of experience matches the apparent 
temporal structure of the objects of experience. (2014a, 139).  
 
If we read “the objects of experience” here in an unqualified way, as picking out primary 
substances as well as events, then the limited matching thesis would seem to generate 
problems for such a ‘naïve view’. But I take it we should resist such a reading. Phillips’s 
focus on the temporal structure of our awareness of events and processes suggests that we 
ought to read “objects of experience” here as restricted to events and processes: the claim 
is that the temporal structure of experience of events and processes matches the apparent 
temporal structure of the events and processes experienced. At the very least, however, 
such a view might tempt the thought that the task of understanding the manifest temporal 
                                                
17 More specifically, they have focussed on the temporal properties of perceptual experience of events and 
processes. I set aside complications concerning the relation between the claims made above and claims 
about the temporal aspects of experience. This is a matter for fuller discussion elsewhere. I note that in the 
recent literature a number of writers have turned attention to the apparent endurance of objects. See for 
example Prosser (2016), chapter 6. Prosser’s discussion builds on ideas suggested in Velleman (2006). 
 23 
properties of perceptual occurrences is just that of understanding the temporal properties 
of the perception of events and processes. In some parts of the literature, indeed, it seems 
to be stipulated that this is so. For example, in setting out the subject-matter of for his 
investigation of the temporal properties of perception, Geoffrey Lee (2014: 149) writes: 
“A temporal experience is an experience that presents to its subject states of affairs that 
manifestly involve duration and change over time, such as the temporal order of sounds, 
the velocity of moving objects, or the duration of a brief flash of light in the visual 
field.”18  
 
One consequence of our discussion here ought to be clarity about the fact that this is a 
restricted conception of a wider field of enquiry. A focus on the manifest temporal 
properties of events and processes confines philosophical attention to only those manifest 
temporal properties of things that go on over time. But the endurance of primary 
substances is a temporal property manifest in our perceptual awareness of objects over 
time, and is no less a temporal phenomenon than the duration, order and succession of the 
processes and changes in which that object is involved. The results of an enquiry focussed 
on the perception of events can provide at best a partial understanding of the relations 
between the temporal properties of perception and of its objects. 
 
I want to end by identifying an area for further research that may serve as a point of 
transition between answers to Q1, about the scope of temporal matching and the nature of 
the matching properties, to answers to Q2, concerning the explanation for this match.  
 
In all this talk about the temporal properties of verb objects and whole verb phrases, where 
has the verb subject gone? Do verb subjects have manifest temporal properties that 
coincide with either the temporal properties of verb objects or with the whole states of 
affairs in which objects are seen, watched or looked at? I have argued that there does not 
seem to be a match between the manifest endurance of primary substances and the 
temporal properties of perceptual activities such as watching an object. But it is notable 
that when one is awake, attentive, and engaged in some such perceptual activity as 
watching an object, there are various matches between the temporal properties of oneself, 
                                                
18 Similarly, Dainton (2014, 101) suggests that ‘temporal experience’ is to be understood simply as 
‘experience of change and succession’. Pelczar (2010) suggests that questions about the temporal properties 
of experience are questions about the temporal properties of experiences of change. 
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as one is aware of oneself, and the manifest temporal properties of the object one watches, 
at least when that object is presented as occupying time in the characteristic way that 
objects do. For example, one is aware of oneself as existing over an interval of time, as 
being capable of atelic activity over that time, as existing in a way that is not temporally 
limited by the starts and stops of such activity. But that, at least so it seems, is also how 
objects seem to one, when one is aware of them as enduring. In addition, one is also aware 
of oneself, in wakeful, attentive, consciousness as possessed of an immediate past and an 
immediate future and so as inhabiting the ‘now’ or as inhabiting ‘the present’. When they 
are encountered in perceptual awareness, manifestly enduring objects seem to one to 
inhabit the very same ‘now’ or ‘present’ which one seems to inhabit oneself, at the time 
one of one’s awareness.19 Here there is a match between oneself and the objects one 
perceives with respect to their being located in the present.20 If these suggestions can be 
substantiated, answers to Q2 will need to be sensitive to the fact that an expanded 
conception of the relevant relata may reveal new temporal matches. But these additional 
burdens may be offset by the fact that understanding the relation of these two forms of 
temporal matching to one another seems to be a natural way to begin answering Q2. 
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